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It is often argued that superluminal velocities and nontrivial spacetime topologies, allowed by the
theory of relativity, may lead to causal paradoxes. By emphasizing that the notion of causality
assumes the existence of a time arrow (TA) that points from the past to the future, the apparent
paradoxes appear to be an artefact of the wrong tacit assumption that the relativistic coordinate
TA coincides with the physical TA. The latter should be identified with the thermodynamic TA,
which, by being absolute and irrotational, does not lead to paradoxes.
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1 INTRODUCTION - A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CAUSAL
PARADOXES
The principle of causality says that the past influences the future, while the future does not
influence the past. Clearly, this principle assumes the existence of a direction of time, that is, a
time arrow (TA) that points from the past to the future. However, according to the theory of
relativity, time is not absolute. In particular, the time ordering of points in spacetime depends
on the choice of the time coordinate. It is often argued that this relativity of time may lead to
causal paradoxes, provided that superluminal propagation of information is possible [1, 2, 3, 4, 5],
or that the geometry and topology of spacetime allows closed timelike curves [6, 7, 8, 9]. The
superluminal propagation of information may be realized through the propagation of particles
with negative squared mass (tachyons) [10, 2, 4], or through a modification of the dispersion
relation (induced by interactions) of massless particles [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. A spacetime
geometry and topology that allows closed timelike curves may be realized with wormholes that
require negative energy [19, 8, 20] and with other mechanisms [6, 7, 21]. There is a lot of
work trying to prove the so called chronology protection conjecture [22, 23, 24, 25, 9, 26], which
essentially says that that the laws of physics conspire so that the physical conditions needed for
a causal paradox cannot realize in nature. However, a convincing proof of this conjecture is still
far from being accomplished [27, 28, 29, 9, 30, 31].
The basic idea for a construction of a causal paradox is allways the same. One has to
construct a causal loop, that is, a globally oriented closed curve in spacetime, such that the
orientation corresponds to the direction from the causes to the consequences. The principle of
causality says that the causes influence the consequences, while the consequences do not influence
the causes. However, since the curve is closed, it is necessary that a cause eventually becomes a
consequence of its own consequence, which may lead to a causal paradox. From the relativistic
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point of view, the paradox can be viewed in the following way. Locally, each point of the causal
loop is oriented from the past to the future, as seen by the corresponding local observer. (When
the curve is timelike, the “corresponding” observer may be identified with an observer that
moves along this curve. When the curve is locally lightlike or spacelike, the “corresponding”
observer may be identified with an observer for which this part of the curve is oriented from the
past to the future.) However, in a fixed global system of coordinates, some parts of the causal
loop may be oriented from the future to the past, while others may be oriented from the past
to the future. This means that, along some parts of the curve, the future may influence the
past, which contradicts the principle of causality. The aim of this paper is to present a general
solution of the causal paradoxes that may appear within the scheme above.
Before starting with a detailed analysis, let us briefly present the conceptual picture for
which we present arguments in the subsequent sections of the paper. At the fundamental level,
time should be treated on an equal footing with space. In this sense, there can be no time-travel
paradoxes, just as there are no space-travel paradoxes. Time does not lapse, just as space does
not lapse. Not every initial condition needs to lead to a consistent solution (of an equation of
motion), just as not every boundary condition needs to lead to a consistent solution. This is
not inconsistent as long as there exist consistent global solutions that are not necessarily found
by fixing an initial or a boundary condition. The notion of causality does not make sense at
the fundamental level. Without causality, there can be no causal paradoxes. However, in order
to explain why many people think that there are causal paradoxes, we need to explain why
they think that there is causality, or why they think that time lapses, or why they think that
every initial condition should lead to a consistent solution. We find that the origin of all such
time-space asymmetric thinkings can be traced back to the existence of the thermodynamic TA,
which, in turn, is not a fundamental phenomenon. In other words, since people live in a universe
with a thermodynamic TA, it seems to them that there are possibilities for causal paradoxes,
despite the fact that in reality there are no possibilities for causal paradoxes at all.
2 THE ORIGIN OF THE ARROW OF TIME
The key point of the solution is the fact that the fundamental laws of physics (at least those
that we know) do not contain any preferred direction of time. There is no difference between
the future and the past at the fundamental level. If the Cauchy problem corresponding to
the fundamental equations of motion is well posed, then the initial data on a Cauchy surface
determine the physical quantities in the both directions from the Cauchy surface. Therefore, from
the fundamental point of view, it is meaningless to say that the past influences the future, but
that the future does not influence the past. In this sense, the principle of causality formulated
as above is not a fundamental physical principle.
The principle of causality is only an effective phenomenological physical law, valid only
on the macroscopic level. The TA pointing from the past to the future exists only on the
macroscopic level. There are various phenomenological manifestations of the TA, such as the
causal TA, the psychological TA and the electrodynamic TA. However, they all can be reduced
to the thermodynamic TA, that is, to the phenomenological rule that entropy (or some other
measure of disorder) increases with time [32, 33, 34, 35]. (For popular explanations, see also
Refs. [36, 37].) Therefore, the physical TA is the thermodynamic TA.
In particular, the origin of the causal TA can be qualitatively understood as follows. When
the Cauchy problem is well posed, then the complete knowledge of the present state determines
uniquelly and self-consistently both the future and the past. However, in practice, we try to draw
conclusions about the future and the past without knowing details of the present state. Thus,
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our conclusions are to a great extent based on statistical arguments. Since disorder increases
with time, statistical arguments can determine the past much better than the future. Therefore,
it is typically easier to see a relation between the presence and the past than to see a relation
between the presence and the future. This is why, in practice, we consider the past as a cause
of the presence, but we do not consider the future as a cause of the presence.
The causal TA is also closely related to the psychological TA, that is, to our psychological
experience that time lapses from the past to the future. This experience is a consequence of
the rule that brains remember the past, but not the future. As recalling allways reduces to an
observation of a present state (of the medium that stores the data) and subsequent conclusion
about events that do not refer to the present time, it is clear that the psychological TA reduces
to the causal TA. (For a recent detailed discussion of the psychological TA see Ref. [38].)
The fact that we live in a universe in which entropy increases with time means that, in the
past, the universe was in a state with a very low entropy. Such a low entropy state is very
improbable and we do not know why the nature have chosen such improbable initial conditions.
(For a recent attempt to explain this, see Refs. [39, 40]. For a general discussion, see, e.g.,
Ref. [41].) However, the point is that the existence of the thermodynamic TA is merely a
macroscopic property of the specific solution in which we live. (In fact, even in an equilibrium
where a TA does not exist, the thermodynamic state still defines the physical time in a fully
general-relativistic background-independent manner [42, 43].)
3 RELATIVISTIC DEFINITION OF THE THERMODYNAMIC
TA
In order to give a more quantitative discussion, let us introduce the entropy density s(x) [44,
45], defined everywhere in the universe. It transforms as a scalar under general coordinate
transformations. (From this scalar, one can also construct the entropy vector sµ = s dxµ/dτ ,
where dxµ/dτ is the macroscopic local 4-velocity of a fluid [44]. Alternatively, if one starts
from the entropy vector as a more fundamenatl quantity, one can define the entropy scalar as
s = |sµsµ|
1/2.) We can define the local TA in an absolute and relativistically covariant way, as
a direction of the gradient of s
tµ = ∂µs. (1)
In fact, the vector tµ does not need to be timelike, but we live in a universe in which it is usually
timelike, so we retain the name “time arrow” (TA). Along a given curve in spacetime, one can
decompose tµ as
tµ = t
‖
µ + t
⊥
µ , (2)
where t
‖
µ is the component of tµ tangential to the curve, while t
⊥
µ is the component normal to
the curve. The vector t
‖
µ defines the local orientation of the curve. The physical TA on the
curve is given by t
‖
µ. If the curve is a timelike trajectory of a local observer, then the TA locally
seen by this observer is given by t
‖
µ, which is a timelike vector. From (2) and (1) we see that
the integral of t
‖
µ over any closed curve is
∮
dxµt‖µ =
∮
dxµtµ = 0. (3)
This implies that a closed curve cannot possess a physical global orientation. Consequently,
a causal loop cannot exist, which eliminates a possibility for a causal paradox. It is a simple
consequence of the fact that the physical TA is a gradient, which implies that it is irrotational.
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4 RELATION BETWEEN CAUSAL PARADOXES AND THE
THERMODYNAMIC TA
Now it is easy to understand the source of apparent causal paradoxes. Consider, for example,
a closed timelike curve xµ(τ), where τ is an affine parameter on the curve equal to the corre-
sponding relativistic proper length. The orientation of the curve can be chosen to be directed
from a smaller to a larger value of τ . The proper length can be interpreted as the proper time
of the observer whose trajectory coincides with the curve. Assuming that such an orientation
correponds to the physical direction of the proper time, one finds a causal paradox. However,
such an orientation is only a coordinate orientation. The true physical orientation is defined
locally by t
‖
µ. It is impossible that the coordinate orientation above everywhere coincides with
the physical orientation. Instead, at some parts of the closed curve, the coordinate TA has the
direction opposite to the physical TA.
The explanation above requires some additional clarifications. One may object that there
are realistic systems in which the local entropy density decreases with the physical time, which
is consistent with the thermodynamical laws which say that only the total entropy of a large
isolated system must increase with the physical time. We have two responses to such objections.
First, in such systems, the physical time is defined globally, as a coordinate with respect to which
the total entropy increases. An observer which only measures the local entropy will naturally
assign a different orientation of physical time. (After all, we cannot be sure that in some distant
parts of the universe invisible by us the entropy of isolated systems does not decrease with
the usual globally defined coordinate time.) Second, for observers that are able to measure
entropy in large regions of spacetime, it is natural to divide the spacetime into appropriately
large regions and to assign the entropy to each region as the average entropy of this region.
This division of spacetime induces also the division of any curve in spacetime. In general, the
neighboring regions of a curve have different entropies, which defines the local orientation of a
curve on each boundary between two regions on the curve. Again, it is easy to see that such a
procedure cannot assign a global orientation to a closed curve, because, if not all regions have
the same entropy, there will be at least two boundaries that have relative orientations that are
inconsistent with the global orientation. This again solves the causal paradoxes.
Some forms of the causal paradox rest on the fact that, for some spacetime topologies, the
Cauchy problem is not well posed [46]. The simplest example is a cylindrical spacetime in which
the time coordinates t = 0 and t = 2pi are identified. As a solution φ(t,x) of the equations
of motion must be periodic such that φ(t,x) = φ(t + 2pi,x), it is clear that not every initial
condition leads to a solution. If one assumes that, in principle, any initial condition can be
realized in nature, then one may obtain a paradox consisting in finding a solution for which
φ(t,x) 6= φ(t + 2pi,x). At first sight, such forms of the paradoxes have nothing to do with the
thermodynamic TA. However, this is not completely true; there is an indirect relation with the
thermodynamic TA. Mathematically, the source of the paradox lies in the wrong assumption that
any initial condition should lead to a solution. Indeed, if one abandones this wrong assumption,
then there is no paradox at all. But the fact that some people think of it as a paradox indicates
that there exists some deeper reason for retaining this assumption. To identify this reason,
consider a cylindrical spacetime in which it is the space coordinate that is compactified. Now it
is the boundary condition (not the initial condition) that cannot be arbitrary. Physicists find
nothing paradoxical with having a constraint on the boundary condition. So why they find
a paradox when it is the initial condition that is constrained, so that it cannot be arbitrary?
Obviously, contrary to the fundamental principle of relativity, they do not treat time on the
equal footing with space. But the only physical source of different treatments of space and time
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is the existence of the physical TA, which, of course, is the thermodynamic TA.
For a complete discussion of causal paradoxes, it is unavoidable to mention the relation
with the concept of “free will” [4, 9, 46]. Some physicists would like to retain the concept
of “free will” compatible with physical laws. They often think of “free will” as something that
determines the initial conditions, so they view a constraint on an initial condition as a constraint
on “free will”, which they often find unsatisfying. However, the usual notion of “free will” that
influences the future but not the past is clearly related to the psychological TA, which, in turn,
is a consequence of the thermodynamic TA. A notion of a “fundamental free will” compatible
with the fundamental physical laws should treat time on the equal footing with space, so there
is no any a priori reason why “free will” should act in terms of initial conditions.
At the fundamental relativistic level, time should be treated on the equal footing with space.
All physical quantities are described by certain functions φ(x), where x are points on spacetime.
The functions φ(x) are required to be single valued. (In fact, if they are not single valued,
then they are not functions at all.) Clearly, the requirement of single valuedness automatically
excludes paradoxes. This requirement is sometimes postulated [47] or derived from other phys-
ical laws [48, 49] as the principle of self-consistency, which serves as a general mechanism that
prevents causal paradoxes. In our view, the principle of self-consistency is merely a tautology
that does not need a separate postulate or an additional justification (see also Ref. [50]). It
needs a separate postulate or a justification if one starts from the assumption that the universe
is fundamentally determined by its initial condition. However, such an assumption is not rela-
tivistic in spirit, but is related to our subjective experience of time that reflects the existence of
the thermodynamic TA. Therefore, we abandon this assumption.
5 CONCLUSION
Our results can be summarized as follows. The apparent causal paradoxes are an artefact of the
wrong tacit assumption that the relativity of time implies also the relativity of the time arrow.
Instead, the TA that makes the distinction between the past and the future is absolute, but
defined only on the macroscopic phenomenological level. Since the theory of relativity does not
allow the existence of an absolute preferred time direction, this constitutes an apparent conflict
between relativity and the arrow of time. However, there is no real conflict, because the TA
is merely a property of a specific solution of (presumably relativistic) equations of motion that
determine our universe.
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